Louis Louw – Pike & Hurricane

Back from the borderlands: taming and framing COVID-19

Louis Louw — Sun, 19 Apr 2020 09:01:20 +0000

Since Covid-19 has begun to spread across the globe, cries for re-establishing, re-enforcing, generally making less permeable, or even shutting down borders have rung louder than ever in recent years. However, this raises the question as to whether Covid-19 can be effectively combatted and curbed by these extraordinary securitization measures along national borders in the times of globalization and its eclectic flows of human interactions and migration.

Scratching the surface for a tentative answer, quarantining certain areas has indeed proved to be effective in restraining the virus from spreading across certain communal, provincial, national, and regional borders. Take the example of the quarantined Chinese province of Wuhan, which seems to have stemmed the tide in one of the heaviest hit regions in the world. Indeed, as from mid-March, life seems to be returning to normal as shops, schools, and other public institutions re-open while the workings of daily life are once again taken in stride.

Symptoms of the borders as antidotes for the state

Despite this initial success, it does not follow that national borders truly are the solution, part and parcel, for combatting Covid-19. In all probability, murky waters will crystallize with the benefit of hindsight as further qualitative and quantitative data is collected and presented. Therefore, I believe it’s too early to dwell on the exact implications of national border securitization as it stands. However, I also believe that it’s important to understand how the discussion of national border securitization frames the idea of the state in relation to its citizenry, by differentiating and (dis)qualifying the citizen from the non-citizen or denizen. What I mean specifically is that the question at hand shouldn’t solely revolve around whether or not national borders are effective in their materiality to protect the citizenry from contagion, but rather that the threat of Covid-19 to this materiality has led to a distinctive and unprecedented comeback in the theoretical and figurative capacity of borders to frame and embody the power of the state. Again, this re-emergence of stately power further draws the line between (non-)citizen, and denizen.

It’s not a border if it’s open, dummie!

In the immediate aftermath of the WHO declaring Covid-19 a pandemic, it was not and still is not uncommon to hear a familiar line of argumentation, which at once carries with it a sense of grief, a pang of anger, and a hope for betterment:

“Why haven’t they shut down the borders!?!”

By ‘they’, of course, national authorities are implied, and it is in this evocation of the state as the guardian of the citizenry, in which the discussion of Covid-19 ultimately proves problematic. In order to protect the body politic, the borders themselves become seen as the infected organ marked for incision through the state’s scalpel. After all, in terms of its effectiveness, the discourse centring on border securitization to curb the spread of Covid-19 is not necessarily wrong. It might indeed impede the rapid spread of the virus, and therefore the means possibly do justify the ends. But the question then arises whether this incision at the borders is the most effective method to combat the spread of the disease? Or if there are any other courses of action that could be just as or even more effective?

From the angle of global problems requiring global solutions, over-reliance on the national state as the sole protector of the citizenry arguably diverts attention and the resources that flow with it from the actual concern at hand, namely, how to engage with global problems through transnational cooperation that benefits people, that is, all people, and not capital? Imagine de-regulating the healthcare sector while slapping fat prices onto its services in the name of efficiency in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. Where has the trust in the universally prescribed forms of development gone, which in their first instance were supposed to secure borders and thus the prosperity of Global Northern states? In terms of global crises, it appears that the chickens are coming home to roost.

The Covid-19 effect

And in this ultimately lies the great conundrum of Covid-19’s impact on modern thinking. If national borders do work, then only because they are valued over the global perspective as the model to fall back on during a crisis. Even more so, as the global system of deregulated and precarious standards set by development practices, well, they don’t seem enticing enough to be co-opted when the fat hits the fire. The theoretical implications are immense. What does it mean and what does it take to think outside a privileged national polity, and what does that mean for non-citizens in general (especially as they potentially already live outside the realm of regulatory dignity) and denizens in particular, who are fed into the machinery of labour and transnational value creation but are yet denied to draw from its surplus, one instance amongst many being dignified health care?

In sum, the impact of Covid-19 will of course be remembered in the overall symptoms it measures, the deaths it sentences, the financial disintegration it exacerbates, the medical innovation it anticipates, or any other effects it entails and produces for that matter. In effect, it will be remembered in how it was tamed. However, for better or for worse, the true legacy of the contagion will find its expression in how it will come to frame the relationship between the state and its (non-)citizenry. That is, in the ways emergencies accentuate, infuse, engender, or mitigate cries for sustainable development worthy of the name with future discussions of belonging to a state, in and for which borders matter more than ever as a first and, perniciously, last line of defence.

Photo credits:

Corona World, MiroslavaChrienova

Passport, OpenClipart-Vectors

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FYI, the name’s Macedonia

Louis Louw — Sat, 22 Feb 2020 15:40:58 +0000

While recently scrolling across Google Maps to untangle the web of Balkan nations, my attention was caught by a newly etched-out national entity. Or at least so I thought. In truth, after some further investigation into the matter, what I had glimpsed was less a newly forged nation and more the latest installment in a longstanding dispute over the nomenclature of Macedonia, upon which both the “former” former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM and now North Macedonia) and Greece lay historical, territorial and identity claims.

Fast-tracking things a bit, this topsy-turvy dispute, which ostensibly spans all the way back to the conquests and spoils of Alexander the Great, took a new turn at the fall and partitioning of Socialist Yugoslavia. Ever since, both sides across the border have been involved in some feisty name-calling, with both sides refusing to back down on their claim over the cultural and territorial heritage of Macedonia. Underscoring this hard egg-or-the-chicken-first stance, a Greek veto all but barred the FYROM from ascension to the EU and by extension opportunities for development, growth, and prosperity.

Let them eat marble statues!

Fuelled by what it perceived as unfair treatment, the FYROM government ramped up its rhetoric by decreeing the fateful Skopje 2014 project, which was supposed to tie the FYROM closer to the glory of its, imaginary, epic past. However, this much derided project, which sought to remake the capital in the light of Greek antiquity, has left some to brand Skopje as the world’s “capital of Kitsch”. Adding insult to injury, the flood of neoclassical statues perched in lofty heights around the capital blew the project’s budget wide open in a country that continuously ranks as one of the poorest in the region.

Ironically, it was only by abandoning this bizarre showcasing of cultural appropriation and political escalation that a mutually beneficial breakthrough was achieved in 2018. Indeed, by re-establishing meaningful diplomatic ties, a formal agreement was reached, which consequently recognized North Macedonia as a nation distinct from the northern Greek province of Macedonia. In this instance, choosing the path of deescalation through dialogue truly paved the way for a better future for both parties. Bearing this in mind, can Skopje 2014 then be seen solely through the lens of the financial debacle that it undoubtedly was? Moreover, should the Macedonian government be considered the Atlas-esque bearer of all the brunt and backlash for its failure?

The M is for misunderstanding

One of the main reasons cited by Greek politicians for the controversy sparked by Skopje’s 2014 great leap backwards, was that the FYROM would potentially not only lay claim to what is seen as essentially Greek identity, but more importantly, that territorial aspirations on Greek soil would arise in tandem. This line of argumentation is reminiscent of the common trope of self-determination, which sees cultural imposition go hand-in-hand with territorial convergence.

However, what this line of argumentation fails to understand — and what I would suggest that the policy-makers behind the botched Skopje 2014 project failed to understand as well — is that the term Macedonia itself had semantically shifted away from the brittle aesthetics of antiquity to an entirely unique Slavic interpretation of the term long before the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia. After all, Slavic populations had been lively in Northern Macedonia for well over a century while carrying the denomination of Macedonia. Therefore, if culture is what one makes of living practices understood in the more mundane configuration of everyday life and experience, how is it to be presumed that Macedonian identity as a concept was frozen in time and space before, during and immediately after the unravelling of Socialist Yugoslavia?

Get off your high horse, Alexander!

Therefore, I am putting the following proposition on the table; I believe that one can fairly assume that, had the Greek claims on Macedonia not arisen in the way they did — territorial integrity of the state at risk! — with the particular meaning they carried — cultural appropriation of classical antiquity as a threat!, then perhaps Skopje 2014 could have been entirely avoidable altogether.

This goes without saying that I am not tip-toeing towards a justification for its bamboozling execution. Rather, what I am suggesting is that by accentuating territory linked to antique culture from a uniquely Greek perspective, the breeding ground for the self-confounded chimera of embittered Greek and Macedonian relations was set to roost birds of exotic feather such as the Skopje 2014 project or the Greek “cultural” riots over ‘identity capitulation’. In this light, Skopje 2014 can almost be seen as the logical consequence of two nations engaging in foreign policy on equally egregious terms.

Instead of negotiating a compromise with consideration to the needs and wishes of everyday citizens on both sides of the divide, the Macedonian and Greek governments failed to live up to their responsibility to foster the well-being of their citizens. What’s more, they made things worse by clashing over dead concepts of identity that have little bearing on the everyday workings, experiences, and problems of the common (wo)man. To conclude, when Guy Delauney inadvertently states that Macedonia “might as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb” with its fumbling extravagance, one may indeed ask how else to get Alexander off his high horse?

by Louis Louw

Photo Credits

Alexander the Great, Mite Kuzevski, CC BY-NY 2.0:

DSC_0069.jpg, mrhong42, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0:

Image, Rosino, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0:

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Fishballs of Fury: Contesting Hong Kong Identity

Louis Louw — Sun, 29 Sep 2019 13:29:13 +0000

It’s Lunar New Year and a cart full of goodies is being pushed through the hustle and bustle of a cramped Hong Kong street. In an instant, a mouth-watering smell rises into the air, drawing in hungry tummies as plates of fishballs exchange hands. A once common sight with as many as 50 000 hawkers and informal vendors plying their trade in the 1970s, Hong Kong now only boasts around 6 000 legally licensed food hawkers to cater to a hungry Hong Kong populace.

This community of itinerant hawkers or food peddlers infamously and affectionately referred to as the jau gwei (lit. running from ghosts) scatter in all directions as warning cries of approaching authorities fill the streets. Without official documentation, many jau gwei operate illegally with small carts which they push towards jostling markets and busy city intersections. Always on the hunt for their next sale, the jau gwei have long been considered a public nuisance by authorities seeking stricter regulations on the informal food market. Hygienic standards, noise pollution, and traffic congestion are some of the common bureaucratic buzzwords sparking controversy, especially as the jau gwei are seen as an authentic expression of working-class Hong Kong identity.

Fishball Riot 2016

Therefore, it is barely a surprise that attempts by city authorities – whether backed by the British Crown or mainland China – to regulate the jau gwei are viewed with distrust. Traditionally, caution rather than coercion has been the path to follow. However, since the early 2010s, authorities have stepped up their efforts at cracking down on the scene. In the politically charged atmosphere of Hong Kong, the fuse burned through once more in 2016, and culminated in the now infamous violent Mong Kok riot between localist groups and police forces. Heavily concerned with and informed by the notion of self-determination, the latter were quick to jump on the bandwagon to defend what they saw as an interference by mainland China to curb local culture.

The Mong Kok riot was striking for two of its features: first, for the use of violence and second, for the well-known plight of the jau gwei prior the violent outbreak. Two questions arise from these features: why were both sides prepared to fall back to the use violence, and why were the jau gwei worth fighting for or against in this particular instance?

The historical background is to be taken into account as a first instance to delimit the efforts of peaceful protest and its role in challenging the legitimization of the state. The path of Hong Kong identity thereafter gained leeway as an inherently political manifestation in challenging the legitimization of the state, and embedded the plight of the jau gwei within the context of this (re)configuration of Hong Kong identity in the greater pursuit of political representation. Importantly, Hong Kong identity in its particular (re)configuration(s) is taken as a naturally given process. The way of talking about this identity however is variable under the process of discourse, e.g. in the contemporary scope of Hong Kong society and its growing polarization and politicization.

Umbrella Movement 2014

One can’t talk about this polarization without reference to the Umbrella Movement in 2014. In a nutshell, the Umbrella Movement sought by means of popular sentiment to protest for more – and especially fairer – representation in the government. The largely peaceful protests aimed at highlighting and proposing betterment to Hong Kong’s skewed political system ultimately fizzled out in disappointment as the Communist Party neither budged nor exhibited a willingness to engage, let alone negotiate, any solutions. Too high were the rulers and tycoon profiteers in their ivory tower to be touched by the people’s demands. Arguably, by sitting out the wave of discontent, the Communist Party showed its disregard for Hong Kong civil society. What was to be done to effect change?

Due to the resulting disappointment and disillusionment within Hong Kong society, new forms of questioning the authority arose and older ones such as localism or nativism once again gained traction. These groups aimed their sights at the “one nation, two systems” policy. The leading line of argumentation being: if there are two nations with two different sets of essentially different people, then this policy doesn’t work. The Mong Kok riot can be seen in this light, however, it doesn’t offer any clues as to why violence was used.

By means of understanding the resurgent electrification of Hong Kong politics, one must necessarily evaluate the role the jau gwei have been assigned to within it. As a group, which has its historical roots in mainland China yet is firmly embedded within contemporary Hong Kong culture as a space of shared memory, the jau gwei offer a unique green screen to project values, which I argue to be generationally all-encompassing.

Contested Identities

This all encompassing identity is notoriously difficult to pin with two generational camps pitted against each, namely the pro-independence youth versus the island’s elderly. Notably, the historical origins of the jau gwei and Hong Kong bureaucracy have both done their part in fostering a close link between the jau gwei and the (imagined) mainland, especially from an elderly perspective. After all, the jau gwei are descendents from impoverished Chinese mainlanders who sought to scrape a life in the former colony – that’s how the informal food market came into being. Generally, the jau gwei represent the opinions of the elderly mainlanders who prefer maintaining the status quo. In their opinion, retaining Hong Kong’s slight concessions in terms of freedom is considered infinitely better than risking it all for an uncertain outcome.

In addition, the jau gwei’s profession is strictly hereditary as stipulated by Hong Kong law and its licensing practices. These were put into place to restrict access to – and naturally ‘eradicate’ – the itinerant market in favour of tax-paying and state-building revenue opportunities. Attempts to squash the market underscores the ironic twist behind the story of the jau gwei: they are rooted in mainland culture but uprooted by its authority at the same. Keeping tabs with the status quo will not end their plight in the long run. Localists helping the jau gwei only fosters a sense of interdependence amongst Hong Kong citizens that prefer – more and more – the tag of an all-encompassing and distinct Hong Kong identity.

Lion Rock Spirit

Lastly, this all-encompassing identity also finds an outlet of expression in the entrepreneuring Lion Rock Spirit, the can-do mentality that drives the common man to fulfil his potential and live a dignified life within China’s special administrative region. Riding their luck and hardship-hardened, the jau gwei make ends meet as small-scale entrepreneurs in the informal food market, thus, ensuring the legacy of the endeared delicacy despite ever-increasing repression by authorities.

In essence, the jau gwei are more than merely merchants. They are the embodiment of a narrative not dissimilar to the American Dream: social mobility through hard-work embedded in liberal entrepreneurism. Hong Kong’s position – and understanding of itself – as an exceptional city carved out on inhospitable rock by exceptional individuals presupposes the city’s entrepreneurial success.

Through this ideal representation of the Lion Rock Spirit, the jau gwei function as a juxtaposition to the ruthless exploitation of unbridled capitalism under pro-Beijing loyalists before, and especially after, a post-Umbrella Movement political landscape. Unlike the property magnates who distribute financial favours amongst themselves to detriment of the general populace, the jau gwei are of the people and authentically cater to the people. A far cry from the plutocratic megalomania exhibited elsewhere.

In the crossfire of ideology

In summary, the itinerant hawkers and informal food peddlers beloved by Hong Kongers have found themselves in the crossfire of an ongoing ideological debate over cultural, and therefore inherently political, identity in relation to the legitimacy of the state. In the times of localist and nativist groups demanding a Hong Kong for Hong Kongers (pardon, Chinese, mind you), the jau gwei have come to symbolize something distinctly and peculiarly “of and only from Hong Kong” within the discourse of the legitimacy of the state. Moreover, guided by the small-scale entrepreneurial drive of the individual, the jau gwei signal a juxtaposition to unbridled state capitalism backed by a local pro-Beijing plutocracy, which distributes wealth and power amongst its members.

The narrative of the jau gwei is grinded out somewhere between the tension resulting from the unfair distribution of wealth, power, and politics. To what extent may individual partake take in the distribution thereof before becoming troublesome to the state? As the Mong Kok incident has shown, tensions are running high. As unclear as the future of Hong Kong may be, I venture to say that this analysis hints at these areas of contention within Hong Kong society for future developments in the ongoing crisis.

Written by Louis Louw

Photo Credits

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