diplomacy – Pike & Hurricane

Vaccine Diplomacy Clouds Over Southeast Asia

Carl Widegrip Dominguez — Wed, 10 Feb 2021 20:10:06 +0000

On January 20th, Thailand’s government filed criminal charges against Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, a 42-year old politician, for alleged violations of a draconian lèse-majesté law which protects the monarchy from insult or defamation. The offense carries harsh penalties of up to 15 years in prison.

What, then, did Mr. Thanathorn do to prompt such heavy-handed punishment?

Two days earlier, during a Facebook livestream, he expressed concerns over what he felt was an opaque procurement and distribution vaccination scheme laid forth by the Thai government. Additionally, he questioned why the British-Swedish pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca had granted exclusive local production rights of their proprietary COVID-19 vaccine to Siam BioScience, a biopharmaceutical lab wholly owned and managed by the Crown Property Bureau. The bureau itself is a quasi-governmental agency dedicated to managing the assets and property of King Maha Vajiralongkorn. Like all affairs of the Thai Royal family, the bureau and its subsidiaries remains bereft of public scrutiny.

For his indiscretion, the former political opposition leader now finds himself staring down a lengthy prison-sentence, which may be compounded further if he’s found guilty of multiple counts of lèse-majesté or of the notoriously vague Computer Crime Act.

Yet Thanathorn’s case is merely the tip of the iceberg in a region-wide struggle which pits public safety against political interests.

In what can only be described as vaccine diplomacy, governments around Southeast Asia appear to be favoring unmonitored bilateral relations for political support and economic gain over effective and affordable treatment for their citizens.

Beyond the gaffe between AstraZeneca and Thailand, Southeast Asian nations have struck a string of questionable trade deals on vaccine imports and production. That the vaccines have been commodified for negotiations does little to alleviate the woes of international supply shortages and a near-complete lack of local production capabilities in a time of dire need. Of all the major vaccines available on the market, the biggest player on the Southeast Asian negotiation table is China’s Sinovac Biotech Ltd.

Foreign interests and domestic oversights

The public concerns over inadequate transparency surrounding the vaccine rollouts in Thailand are not unique to the nation, but rather endemic of a larger trend of foreign appeasement present among all member states of the chief regional intergovernmental organisation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Over the past decade, growing Chinese influence in the region combined with low levels of domestic accountability has created a precarious political climate.

Prior to the pandemic, China accounted for the largest single group of international visitors to Southeast Asia. This large presence provides a substantial source of tourism revenue, which certain areas are completely reliant upon. Moreover, China has poured in foreign direct investment into Chinese tourism hotspots such as Sihanoukville in southern Cambodia and Hat Yai in southern Thailand, and a myriad of large-scale joint infrastructure developments has been initiated as part of their Belt and Road Initiative, as well as multiple massive hydropower dam constructions on the Mekong River in Laos.

This asymmetric economic dependence is reflected both in political culture and foreign policy. The negative agricultural impact and environmental degradation stemming from the Mekong River projects have been tacitly accepted. China’s expansionist ambitions in the South China Sea are mostly quietly brushed aside. And when China comes knocking for a show of public support, the ASEAN members are usually happy to oblige them.

Nam Gnouang Dam on a tributary of the Nam Theun River in Laos.

So before many prominent vaccine manufacturers had even published reliable data from their late-stage clinical trials, many Southeast Asian nations had already decided to go with Sinovac as their premier choice.

Indonesia is one such example. After vocalizing early support, authorities signed an agreement with Sinovac as far back as August 25th, 2020—just two weeks after the launch of an Indonesian clinical trial—to import three million doses from China by January 2021 and to later initiate the localized production of at least 40 million additional doses via an Indonesian biopharmaceutical company.

First in line to receive the shot was Indonesian President Joko Widodo on January 13th. In a public display of cosy Indonesia-China relations, a broadly televised event showed President Widodo receiving the initial dose live, along with close-up shots of the Sinovac boxes.

The date is of note, too; two days earlier, on January 11th, Indonesia’s Food and Drug Authority reported their interim findings of the aforementioned clinical trial and claimed the vaccine was 65.3% effective, and was granted emergency use authorization. The next day, Brazil’s local production partner of Sinovac, Butantan, determined the general efficacy of the vaccine at just 50.4% in their late-stage clinical trial.

So while still technically fulfilling the vaccine guidelines set out by the World Health Organization of minimum 50% efficacy, one might expect such low figures to cast the televised publicity stunt into question, or cause some trepidation in the subsequent mass rollout. However, the Indonesian government proceeded with their plan unaltered, and health authorities defended the move citing an urgent need to protect its health workers.

Indonesia is not alone in this regard. Negotiations for the import of hundreds of millions of Sinovac vaccines in aggregate across Southeast Asia have already concluded. The Philippines committed themselves to 25 millions doses due for import in February, at allegedly dubious price mark-ups. Vietnam is primarily looking at importing the AstraZeneca vaccine, but is still in discussions regarding possible Sinovac additions. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand each had millions of Sinovac doses slated for delivery, but all deals are currently on halt pending more clinical trial data from China after Brazil’s disappointing findings.

Laos and Myanmar, two of the region’s poorest nations, are both notable cases of vaccine diplomacy. Labelled “priority” recipients by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the two nations’ low bargaining power and weak international clout render them especially susceptible to foreign interests.

Laos is one of the few nations set to receive the Russian-made vaccine Sputnik V, but is concurrently in talks to supplement national rollout with Sinovac.

Local publication Myanmar Times reports that a multitude of behind-closed-doors bilateral talks between Myanmar’s Ambassador in Beijing and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in an agreement to ship the Chinese vaccine to Myanmar by early 2021. In order to secure the deal, Wang Yi sought the support of Myanmar’s ruling military junta for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor—a localized subsection of the larger Belt and Road Initiative.

The afflictions of politics

While negotiations for the right product at the right price occurs all over the world, Southeast Asia’s propensity for non-transparency in foreign affairs create distinctive issues. There are many economically impaired areas in the region without access to adequate healthcare and which lack a strong international voice to bring attention to any shortcomings of governance. Putting the lives and safety of these peoples and front-line workers at risk, to employ under-the-table dealings to cement diplomatic allegiances is unethical at best and possibly devastating at worst.

As mentioned at the start, not only does this secrecy create civil and legal issues for people who dare to ask the tough questions—as for Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit—but create far reaching public safety issues as well.

After being alerted of the legal charges the Thai government levied against Mr. Thanathorn, AstraZeneca may be showing signs of reconsidering their partnership with Siam BioScience, as a planned news conference on the authorization of the vaccine was abruptly cancelled on January 22nd. The fear of getting dragged into political hot waters may be an understandable disposition for AstraZeneca, but it also means that 50,000 doses that were scheduled to be administered in February might now be in jeopardy.

With the Sinovac rollout now also being temporarily suspended, uncertainty looms large over Thailand’s vaccination scheme. With a population of nearly 70 million, and with no available vaccines at the ready, more victims and economic hardships are sure to follow in the wake of callous vaccine diplomacy.

Related articles:

Unheard South Solidarity: The Asian-African Conference

One Belt, One Road – China’s Path to the West

Photo credits:

“Wat Pho. Bangkok.”, by Adaptor- Plug on flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0

“Nam Gnouang Dam (60MW), on a tributary of the Nam Theun River in Laos”, by Eric Baran, via WorldFish on flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

The post Vaccine Diplomacy Clouds Over Southeast Asia appeared first on Pike & Hurricane.

FYI, the name’s Macedonia

Louis Louw — Sat, 22 Feb 2020 15:40:58 +0000

While recently scrolling across Google Maps to untangle the web of Balkan nations, my attention was caught by a newly etched-out national entity. Or at least so I thought. In truth, after some further investigation into the matter, what I had glimpsed was less a newly forged nation and more the latest installment in a longstanding dispute over the nomenclature of Macedonia, upon which both the “former” former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM and now North Macedonia) and Greece lay historical, territorial and identity claims.

Fast-tracking things a bit, this topsy-turvy dispute, which ostensibly spans all the way back to the conquests and spoils of Alexander the Great, took a new turn at the fall and partitioning of Socialist Yugoslavia. Ever since, both sides across the border have been involved in some feisty name-calling, with both sides refusing to back down on their claim over the cultural and territorial heritage of Macedonia. Underscoring this hard egg-or-the-chicken-first stance, a Greek veto all but barred the FYROM from ascension to the EU and by extension opportunities for development, growth, and prosperity.

Let them eat marble statues!

Fuelled by what it perceived as unfair treatment, the FYROM government ramped up its rhetoric by decreeing the fateful Skopje 2014 project, which was supposed to tie the FYROM closer to the glory of its, imaginary, epic past. However, this much derided project, which sought to remake the capital in the light of Greek antiquity, has left some to brand Skopje as the world’s “capital of Kitsch”. Adding insult to injury, the flood of neoclassical statues perched in lofty heights around the capital blew the project’s budget wide open in a country that continuously ranks as one of the poorest in the region.

Ironically, it was only by abandoning this bizarre showcasing of cultural appropriation and political escalation that a mutually beneficial breakthrough was achieved in 2018. Indeed, by re-establishing meaningful diplomatic ties, a formal agreement was reached, which consequently recognized North Macedonia as a nation distinct from the northern Greek province of Macedonia. In this instance, choosing the path of deescalation through dialogue truly paved the way for a better future for both parties. Bearing this in mind, can Skopje 2014 then be seen solely through the lens of the financial debacle that it undoubtedly was? Moreover, should the Macedonian government be considered the Atlas-esque bearer of all the brunt and backlash for its failure?

The M is for misunderstanding

One of the main reasons cited by Greek politicians for the controversy sparked by Skopje’s 2014 great leap backwards, was that the FYROM would potentially not only lay claim to what is seen as essentially Greek identity, but more importantly, that territorial aspirations on Greek soil would arise in tandem. This line of argumentation is reminiscent of the common trope of self-determination, which sees cultural imposition go hand-in-hand with territorial convergence.

However, what this line of argumentation fails to understand — and what I would suggest that the policy-makers behind the botched Skopje 2014 project failed to understand as well — is that the term Macedonia itself had semantically shifted away from the brittle aesthetics of antiquity to an entirely unique Slavic interpretation of the term long before the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia. After all, Slavic populations had been lively in Northern Macedonia for well over a century while carrying the denomination of Macedonia. Therefore, if culture is what one makes of living practices understood in the more mundane configuration of everyday life and experience, how is it to be presumed that Macedonian identity as a concept was frozen in time and space before, during and immediately after the unravelling of Socialist Yugoslavia?

Get off your high horse, Alexander!

Therefore, I am putting the following proposition on the table; I believe that one can fairly assume that, had the Greek claims on Macedonia not arisen in the way they did — territorial integrity of the state at risk! — with the particular meaning they carried — cultural appropriation of classical antiquity as a threat!, then perhaps Skopje 2014 could have been entirely avoidable altogether.

This goes without saying that I am not tip-toeing towards a justification for its bamboozling execution. Rather, what I am suggesting is that by accentuating territory linked to antique culture from a uniquely Greek perspective, the breeding ground for the self-confounded chimera of embittered Greek and Macedonian relations was set to roost birds of exotic feather such as the Skopje 2014 project or the Greek “cultural” riots over ‘identity capitulation’. In this light, Skopje 2014 can almost be seen as the logical consequence of two nations engaging in foreign policy on equally egregious terms.

Instead of negotiating a compromise with consideration to the needs and wishes of everyday citizens on both sides of the divide, the Macedonian and Greek governments failed to live up to their responsibility to foster the well-being of their citizens. What’s more, they made things worse by clashing over dead concepts of identity that have little bearing on the everyday workings, experiences, and problems of the common (wo)man. To conclude, when Guy Delauney inadvertently states that Macedonia “might as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb” with its fumbling extravagance, one may indeed ask how else to get Alexander off his high horse?

by Louis Louw

Photo Credits

Alexander the Great, Mite Kuzevski, CC BY-NY 2.0:

DSC_0069.jpg, mrhong42, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0:

Image, Rosino, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0:

The post FYI, the name’s Macedonia appeared first on Pike & Hurricane.

Insults, provocation, net-politics: The war of words

Pauline Zaragoza — Sun, 29 Sep 2019 14:29:29 +0000

How new populist leaders have killed the way to practice diplomacy

In 2016, the election of Donald Trump, a former TV star, as head of the first global power marked a turning point on the world stage. The following past years have seen the arrival of other populist leaders in global superpowers such as Italy, Brazil and recently in the United Kingdom. This along with the use of social media has shuffled the cards of diplomacy’s practice.

By definition, diplomacy is the management of relationships between countries but it also implies to deal with people without offending or upsetting them. But the performance we have assisted to those previous years does not seem to correspond to this meaning anymore.

Fake news, hate speech, insults spread by political leaders have become our daily reality. In the past, we used to assist to those types of rude behavior within countries between parties. What’s new is that it is happening now at the global scale between global superpowers. This shift can be explained by the democratic accession of far-right politicians who usually represent the hard opposition to power.

Bolsonaro: provocation as the norm

One of the greatest examples of this rude diplomacy is Bolsonaro, Brazil’s president. Last summer, the Brazilian president made some great performances. During the visit of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Yves Le Drian, he decided at the last minute to stand him up for doing a Facebook live while he was at the hairdresser. A few days later, he declared about environmental issues:

“It’s enough to eat a little less. You talk about environmental pollution. It’s enough to poop every other day. That will be better for the whole world.”

He pronounced those words while the Amazon rainforest was being torn down at a rate that it has never seen before. Then, to sustain his momentum, he rudely insulted Macron’s wife on Twitter by commenting a tweet describing her as ugly. At the same time, one of the Brazilian ministers used the Portuguese word « calhorda » to describe the French president, which can be translated as “idiot”, “bastard” or “trickster”. A word very far from the traditional diplomatic vocabulary. The response of the French president didn’t take long to come. He declared with diplomatic words:

“He said very disrespectful things about my wife. I have great respect for the Brazilian people and can only hope they soon have a president who is up to the job”.

Is this diplomatic behaviour new?

Diplomacy has its own rules. The job of diplomats such as President is to weigh the words, use euphemism and play with semantic shades. Diplomacy as an institution appeared in the Middle Age around the sixteenth centuries. Its aim was to ensure peace and set up trade by negotiations as a tool to avoid violence. This came with stabilization between states thanks to the creation of multilateral institutions such as the League of Nations and later the United Nations, with the ratification of treaty such as the Vienna Treaty in 1815 or the International Human Rights Convention in 1948.

In addition, diplomacy is a perfect instrument when it comes to solving international crisis for example, the Cuban crisis. At least, it was created to put an end to the practice of selfish states who were only looking out for their own interests. Diplomacy helps to negotiate a conflict outcome, put a stop to state raid and raise collective security.

In the past, even Hitler wasn’t insulted by other countries’ leaders. Also, during the Cold War, both sides worried about each other’s action and thus use the diplomatic language. Usually in diplomacy, leaders used to speak frankly only in private. With time, it’s getting worse. During his presidency, Obama was treated as “son of a whore” by Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte, Johnson (who after becoming chief diplomat) compared Hillary Clinton to “a sadistic nurse in a mental hospital”, Trump named Kim Jong-Un in front of the UN Assembly “the Rocket Man”. We are spectators of a shifting diplomacy where insults represent the standards way of talking.

A redefinition of the political leader

This change in the political landscape raises the question of the definition of a political leader. Is it implied to be exemplary or a good person? Are Obama, Trudeau or Macron the definition of good leaders?

The Latin “Regere” means to govern and to act rightly. At least, is governing a moral matter? Because besides their disrespectful behavior, those extremist leaders have been democratically elected because they represented political game’s transparency. People are fed up with the expectation to be politically correct. They are acting, that is why there are in power now.

They represent their countries interest in a provocative way as Trump showed recently by his will to buy Greenland from Denmark to insure the US’s position in the subsurface resources race. Even with all those “diplomatic incidents”, it is working as they are popular in their country. They have legitimized a new style by institutionalizing their rude, impolite and unfiltered behavior and vocabulary. Perhaps right now governance means to behave badly.

Good things even in the worst times

However, there is still light in the dark. As well as there being those populist leaders, there are “standard” political leaders who do not have rude behavior as strategy. Diplomacy is not dead as the Pope gave us the proof when he sent a message to Donald Trump without naming him:

“A person who thinks only about building walls — wherever they may be — and not building bridges, is not Christian.”

In addition, this change has led to an increase of the political commitment. In France, during the second round of the presidential elections there was a huge mobilization against the far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. On Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, people are mobilized against populist leaders’ action. Demonstrations for climate change are growing around the world even if populist leader try to spread the fake news that global warming doesn’t exist. Associations for human rights, refugees’ rights, and LGBTQ rights are more active than ever in reaction to those leaders.

The hope and the opposition are here. But this change in the diplomatic area may be the reflection of our time. The question is “How are we going to respond to it?”

Written by Pauline Zaragoza

Photo Credits

Jair Bolsonaro, Jeso Carneiro, CC BY-NC 2.0

Union nations Headquarters, United Nations Photo, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Climate change march, Matthew Kirby, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Declaracao a impresa, Palacio do Planalto, CC BY 2.0

The post Insults, provocation, net-politics: The war of words appeared first on Pike & Hurricane.